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What will be the face of Islam in the twenty-first centu-
ry? A preoccupation with the future is always acute at
the turning of a century, still more so at the turning of a
millennium. The speculation about world futures, from
the optimistic ÔEndismÕ of Francis Fukuyama to the pes-
simistic ÔClash of CivilizationsÕ of Samuel Huntington, is
already well under way in the West.
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In the predictions of these generalists, Islam
and the Muslim world receive fairly short shrift,
at least as far as their internal evolution is con-
cerned. The generalists have been criticized by
the area specialists, on the usual grounds that
the generalists do not know enough about
Islam or Muslims to generalize. But the critics
have yet to engage in the same kind of con-
trolled speculation, or to provide alternatives
of their own. Over the last century, the most
commonplace prediction for the future of
Islam has been its renaissance along Western
lines. Commenting on the trend in Islamic
thought in the 1880s, the English poet-explor-
er Wilfrid Scawen Blunt wrote that it Ôstood in
close analogy to what we have seen of the re-
awakening of the Christian intellect during the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Europe and
its adaptation of orthodox doctrines to the sci-
entific discoveries of the day.Õ1 An American
observer put the same idea this way in 1963:
ÔPerhaps the Arab world in this century is in the
first pages of a renaissance that may ultimately
be comparable to the changes that took place
in Western society in the fifteenth century.Õ2 Ô I f
my suspicion is correct,Õ writes a leading Amer-
ican anthropologist in 1998, Ôwe will look back
on the latter half of the 20th century as a time
of change as profound for the Muslim world as
the Protestant Reformation was for Christen-
d o m . Õ3 This expectation of reformation is a
recurring theme in the Western vision of Islam.
It leaves nothing to predict but the proximate
emergence of a Luther, followed by the mod-
ernization of Islam and the emergence of
democratic governance. Yet while the twenti-
eth century has been the stage of numerous
ÔrevolutionsÕ in the name of the people or the
nation or Islam, it could well be argued that
Muslims have failed to resolve issues which
appeared on their agenda a century ago.
Indeed, the more instructive analogy may not
be with the fifteenth century in Europe, but
with the end of the nineteenth century in the
Middle East.
1900 and 2000:
B A C K  T O  T H E  F U T U R E
Indeed, there are striking parallels between
the end of the nineteenth century and the end
of the twentieth. And if repetition is one possi-
ble scenario, analogous reasoning may offer
some clue to the future.
The global context
It is the global context which defines the
parameters of action in the Middle East. Then
as now, preservation of the status quo in the
Middle East was a prime interest of the great
powers. The European order itself seemed sta-
ble: there had been no major European war
since the end of the Franco-Prussian war in
1871. Great Britain, anxious to guarantee its
access to India, became effective guarantor of
the existing order in the Middle East. The foun-
dations of that order were being eroded by
nationalism in Egypt, and Britain had acted to
protect the route to India by occupying Egypt.
Yet it also became the champion of the territo-
rial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and led
the powers in shoring up the status quo.
Is this not similar to the situation today? The
West now also enjoys a long peace, secured
through dtente and the end of the cold war.
Under the Pax Americana, the US guarantees
the worldÕs access to oil at reasonable prices,
and when that access has been challenged, the
US has moved to restore and keep its peace, as
it did following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
The US role in managing the Arab-Israeli peace
process is no less an example of its status as
ultimate guarantor. The US largely acts off
shore, without the need for prolonged occupa-
tions, but its ability to project power is still for-
m i d a b l e .
Ultimately it is the US that underwrites the
stability and status quo of the Middle East. But
if a repetition is possible, then perhaps the
Middle Eastern order will be buffeted by some
dramatic shift in the international order. It has
always been difficult for one outside power to
maintain hegemony in the Middle Eastern sys-
tem, the very structure of which invites chal-
lenges. A century ago, there was a Pax Britanni-
ca, but the first decades of the twentieth cen-
tury saw a gradual emergence of continental
powers rivalling Britain in Europe and over-
seas. These rivalries were carried over into the
Middle East; they ultimately led to war and the
break-up of the Ottoman Empire. If rivals to the
United States emerge over the next twenty
years, might their rivalry spill over into the Mid-
dle East? Unified Europe is on the doorstep of
the Middle East, has a vital interest in its stabil-
ity, and is already staking out independent
policies. When China begins to emerge from
the role of regional power to that of a world
power, the Middle East will be of paramount
importance to it, on account of ChinaÕs grow-
ing energy needs. If Europe and China assert
themselves in the Middle East, might this
undermine or upset the order America now
g u a r a n t e e s ?
The Domestic Stalemate
At the end of both centuries, the regimes of
the region seemed not only stable, but unas-
sailable. In the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Abdl-
hamid II had come to power in 1876, and
would continue until 1908, a reign of 32 years.
In the Qajar Empire, Nasir al-Din Shah had just
ended a 48-year reign, which had commenced
in 1846 and ended with his assassination in
1896. Their long personal rule epitomized the
long period of political immobility that
seemed to characterize the last two decades of
the last century.
Today, too, the Middle East is ruled by the
same men who ruled it a generation ago and
more. King Hussein has ruled Jordan since
1953. King Hasan has ruled Morocco since
1961. Asad has presided over Syria since 1971.
Qadhdhafi made his coup in Libya in 1969.
Arafat has been chairman of the PLO since
1969. KuwaitÕs Emir has ruled Kuwait since
1978, with help from foreign friends who
restored him to his throne. IraqÕs Saddam Hus-
sein has been president since 1979, and
EgyptÕs Mubarak since 1981. The Arab lands
are today the last preserve of protracted indi-
vidual rule in the world. This is a symptom of
political immobility, of a failure to find any way
to regulate political change. In this respect, the
parallel between the end of both centuries is
almost exact.
But the first decade of the twentieth century
saw two constitutional revolutions, in both the
Ottoman Empire and Iran. Is it possible that
beneath the surface of todayÕs authoritarian
rule, there are forces coalescing that could try
to establish limits on the arbitrary powers of
rulers? Might these forces be capable, in
another decade or so, of effecting constitu-
tional revolutions? (Today we would probably
call them Ôdemocratic revolutions.Õ) Whether
they would succeed is another matter, but the
turmoil they would unleash might see the tri-
umph of the same populist forces that first
appeared in the beginning of this century, in
the guise of nationalism.
The Islamic Factor
Towards the end of the last century, there
had been a revival of Islam, and even an Islam-
ic revolution in Sudan. That revolution, taking
a millenarian and Mahdist form, had defied the
great power of the day, Britain, and had estab-
lished an Islamic state in 1885 that lasted thir-
teen years, until Britain destroyed it by force.
Elsewhere in the Muslim world, other revivalist
movements seemed to threaten the status
q u o .
Does this not closely parallel our own times?
This, too, has been a period of Islamic revival.
There has been an Islamic revolution in Iran,
also with strong millenarian overtones, defy-
ing the great power of our own day, America.
(The US was traumatized by the seizure of the
American embassy in Tehran in ways reminis-
cent of the shock delivered to Britain by Gor-
donÕs fate at Khartoum.) Elsewhere, in the rest
of what used to be called the ÔNorthern Tier,Õ
Islamists have made themselves felt in Turkey,
and they have taken complete power in
Afghanistan. South of Egypt, bulwark of US
influence in the Arab Middle East, Sudan is also
under Islamist rule. And of course other
Islamist movements have emerged to chal-
lenge the status quo.
But the first decade or so of the twentieth
century saw the containment, then the
decline, of Islam as a focus of political alle-
giance. Is it not possible that in a decadeÕs
time, the Islamic revival will also appear as a
phase that exhausted itself, as other ideologies
of power more directly inspired by the West
make their long-delayed comeback? Already
there are signs that the Islamist surge has been
blunted. Might it even be reversed?
The Minority Factor
A century ago, European and local minorities
in the Middle East were at the peak of their
influence, from Algeria to Tunisia, from Egypt
to Syria. They were the engines of economic
growth, and they formed a target of growing
Muslim resentment.
The new nationalism identified the erosion
of minority power as an immediate objective,
so that no minorities exercise this kind of influ-
ence in any Arab state today. But today, a con-
centration of five million Jews in the state of
Israel, with strong links to the West, has
acquired immense military and economic
power. As in the past, this exercise of non-Mus-
lim power in the heart of the Muslim world is
the cause of a continuing Muslim resentment.
Might the erosion of IsraelÕs power remain a
prime objective of the Arab world, whether
pursued through diplomacy or confrontation?
If so, the Arab-Israeli conflict, rather than end-
ing in final peace agreements, may have
entered a new phase.
More parallels could be drawn, some more
persuasive than others. The historian might
well be tempted to borrow the phrase coined
by an American athlete: dj vu all over again.
Still, the repetition of history is not its replica-
tion, and many of todayÕs realities have no par-
allel. Two are particularly striking: the dissemi-
nation of weapons of mass destruction, and
the explosion of populations. These are the
two wild cards that could well shatter the exist-
ing political and social structure of the Middle
East and bring on ungovernable change. They
would create difficulties not only for the West,
but dangers for the peoples of the Middle East
i t s e l f .
Islamic Reformation?
No doubt, there will be crises and changes Ð
but a reformation? A century ago, the great
Islamicist Ignaz Goldziher predicted that Islam
could be regenerated from within Ð not
through a Ôreturn to the Qur'anÕ which, Ôcon-
trary to the laws of historical evolution, risks
putting Islam behind instead of modernizing
it,Õ but rather through bold, rational reinterpre-
t a t i o n .4 It did not happen. In the twentieth
century, some Muslims simply abandoned
Islam for Western doctrines, and others opted
for the Ôreturn to the Qur'an,Õ embodied in a
militant and aggrieved fundamentalism.
If a reform is in the making, the work of adap-
tation has not yet even begun. An American
historian of Islam has put it succinctly: ÔThe
ideas that will be taken as the most authorita-
tive synthesis of Islam and modern conditions
fifty years from now have not yet been thought
and are not on the current agenda.Õ5 If the
thoughts have not been thought, if the issues
have not been defined, then the twentieth
century can only be described as an opportuni-
ty lost. Its repetition is something even a faith
as vibrant as Islam can ill afford. '
Dr Martin Kramer is director of the Moshe Dayan
Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies,
T e l Aviv University
N o t e s
1 . Wilfrid Scawen Blunt (1907), Secret History of
t h e English Occupation of Egypt. London: Unwin,
p . 102. The reference here is to Jamal al-Din Ôal-
A f g h a n i .
2 . Charles F. Gallagher, ÔLanguage, Culture, Ideology:
The Arab World,Õ in: K.H. Silvert (ed.) E x p e c t a n t
Peoples: Nationalism and Development, New York:
Random House, 1963, p. 229.
3 . Dale F. Eickelman, ÔInside the Islamic Reformation,Õ
Wilson Quarterly 22, no. 1 (winter 1998), p. 82.
4 . Ignaz Goldziher, ÔLÕAvenir de lÕIslam,Õ Q u e s t i o n s
diplomatiques et coloniales (Paris) 11, no. 102
( 1 5 May 1901), pp. 600-2.
5 . Richard W. Bulliet, ÔRhetoric, Discourse, and the
Future of Hope,Õ in: Richard W. Bulliet (ed.) U n d e r
Siege: Islam and Democracy, New York: Middle East
Institute, Columbia University, 1994, pp. 11-12.
